The first feature we include in our IEA model for biodiversity conservation is the specification of a hyperbolic cost function. This specification is crucial in the case of biodiversity, as countries have a certain endowment of biodiversity that can be maintained within their borders. The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Additional Protocol was adopted in Nagoya in 2010 as a supplement to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The Additional Protocol establishes international rules and procedures on liability and redress for damage to biodiversity caused by genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Switzerland ratified the Additional Protocol on 27 October 2014. The Additional Protocol is still in force, but its provisions are harmonized with the applicable Swiss Genetic Engineering Act (GTA RS 814.91). The results of the scenarios suggest that Scenario II, which incorporates transfers, shows the greatest potential benefits of cooperation and conservation. Even if the maximum size of a stable coalition does not change when transfers are included, all countries are willing to transfer a portion of their profits individually to the country with the largest biodiversity endowment (C12) to ensure that it is part of a 2-member agreement. Coalitions of 2 members, including C12, have the best payment in the world. Not surprisingly, we observe that trade is more efficient when the countries concerned are different. Salles, J.M. (2011). Appreciating biodiversity and ecosystem services: why attach economic value to nature? Comptes Rendus Biologies, 334(5–6), 469–482.
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSPs) are the main instruments for implementing the Convention at the national level. The Convention requires countries to develop a national biodiversity strategy and to ensure that this strategy is integrated into the planning of activities in all sectors where diversity may be affected. As of early 2012, 173 parties had developed NHPs.  Swanson, T., & Groom, B. (2012). Regulation of global biodiversity: what is the problem? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 28(1), 114–138. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grs003 Except in cases where the local benefits of conservation are very high, our results in terms of creating a large self-assertive IEA are rather bleak. In terms of political implications, the stability of small, stable coalitions of 2 members might suggest that the development of bilateral agreements for effective preservation might be more desirable than a single large agreement.
An analysis of the stability of coalitions with several coalitions would be beyond the scope of our study; However, it can be explored in future research. This article contributes to the emerging literature on international environmental agreements by analysing the main features of biodiversity conservation. We examine three characteristics specific to an international conservation agreement: the existence of a natural upper limit of conservation in each country, the importance of local benefits, and the under-dependence of the global conservation function. We examine asymmetries in the benefits and costs of conservation and separately in the upper limit of conservation in each country and examine the impact of these characteristics on the stability of the coalition and on the effectiveness of biodiversity agreements. The results show that the underdidivity of the global conservation function can lead to larger stable coalitions. The inclusion of a transfer system that could be implemented, by . B through international trade in biodiversity credits, can affect the composition of the coalition and improve conservation outcomes and the size of stable coalitions in certain areas of the parameter space. Our model shares some characteristics with a model developed by Winands et al. (2013), but differs in some important aspects. First of all, the specification of the model is different. While Winands et al. (2013) using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function to account for different degrees of substitutability between ecosystems, we use a quadratic advantage function to represent the subaddictability of global biodiversity conservation.
Second, Winands et al. (2013) use protected hectares as a conservation measure, while we propose a species count. Third, the four country categories in our model differ from those presented in their study. In Winands et al. (2013), countries differ in two dimensions: prosperity and biodiversity richness, while in our model countries, the benefits and costs of nature conservation differ. Finally, we consider a model with (n = 12) countries (with 3 countries in each category), which makes it possible to take into account many different types of agreements, i.e. Coalitions composed of different numbers and types of countries. Winands et al. (2013) limit their analysis to four countries, (n = 4), one of each type. There is another important reason to join the agreement: the United States could help other countries develop conservation strategies that do not come at the expense of indigenous peoples and local communities, which has been the case in the past. Clinton won the election in 1992 and signed the treaty shortly after taking office, a move welcomed by conservationists.
But there was still a major obstacle to CBD membership – ratification by the Senate, which requires 67 votes. We use the terms « preservation » and « preservation » as synonyms throughout the manuscript. To the extent possible, the SCB sends official delegations of staff and volunteers to the negotiating sessions of the Convention on Biological Diversity and other international negotiating meetings. SCB expert members promote the position statements approved by the Steering Committee and actively participate in political discussions at these important meetings and negotiations. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), informally known as the Convention on Biological Diversity, is a multilateral treaty. The Convention has three main objectives: the conservation of biological diversity (or biodiversity); the sustainable use of its components; and the equitable and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources. The aim is to develop national strategies for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and is often seen as the key document for sustainable development. The second feature deals with the mismatch between the scales at which the costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation take place. The cost of conserving biodiversity is local, but the benefits of conservation are perceived at different levels: local, regional and global. GHG reductions affect the global concentration of greenhouse gases, regardless of where the reductions take place, although the local impact of these reductions may vary from country to country. In contrast, biodiversity conservation is not a purely public good, as local conservation measures at the local level can bring more immediate benefits. The overall benefits of biodiversity are those related to the common good dimension of biodiversity: people cannot be prevented from enjoying biodiversity (non-excludability), and a person`s enjoyment of biodiversity does not exhaust his or her availability to others (non-rivalry) (Alvarado-Quesada et al.
2014). Local biodiversity benefits correspond to the benefits directly perceived by local biodiversity. For the purposes of this study, we use countries to represent the local dimension. For example, the conservation of the world`s forests brings benefits to biodiversity that are perceived globally, regardless of where conservation efforts take place. However, in addition to these global benefits, forest protection brings with it local benefits that are directly perceived by the inhabitants of the area where conservation takes place, such as wood and non-timber forest products, improved air quality and recreational benefits. In the base scenario of our model with hyperbolic costs, local benefits and a subadditive maintenance function, we also find a stable coalition of up to 2 members. Larger stable coalitions can only be achieved if the local benefits of conservation are significant relative to the global benefits. Even full cooperation is possible, but in such a case, the benefits of cooperation are small.
Perrings, C., & Gadgil, M. (2003). Biodiversity conservation: Balancing local and global benefits to the public. In I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. The Goulven, & R. Mendoza (ed.), Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (pp. 532-555). Oxford: Oxford University Press. In the previous sections, we have developed a non-cooperative game theory model of an IEA for biodiversity conservation. To this end, we have formulated a number of assumptions to simplify the assessment of the coalition`s stability analysis.
In this section, we describe possible extensions of the model where some of these assumptions are abandoned. We deal with the following extensions: (1) an alternative theoretical approach to play for the analysis of coalition stability, (2) the integration of empirical results into the theoretical model, and (3) the use of alternative hypotheses for our species conservation model. These concerns sparked a series of meetings between environmental groups and UN officials in the `80s and early `90s that laid the groundwork for a treaty to protect biodiversity. U.S. diplomats have been heavily involved in these discussions, said William Snape III, an environmental lawyer and associate dean at American University and senior counsel at the Center for Biological Diversity, an advocacy group. .